Analysis: Who is buying Russian Energy? NATO or BRICS?

Western media and certain politicians are expressing concerns regarding India's increase in buying of Russian energy, even threatening tariffs in response. NATO chief Mark Rutte has gone so far as to state that both India and China must contact Russian President Putin to request a ceasefire in Ukraine, or they risk facing sanctions. To quote Mark Rutte, "So please make the phone call to Vladimir Putin and tell him that he has to get serious about peace talks, because otherwise this will slam back on Brazil, on India and on China in a massive way," Rutte added.

There are allegations that BRICS nations, particularly India and China, are significantly purchasing energy and thereby contributing to the Ukraine conflict. However, the reality is quite different, a fact that Americans and Europeans seem unwilling to acknowledge. As the spokesperson for India's Ministry of External Affairs stated, this reflects "double standards" and cautioned the NATO chief against making hasty assumptions.

Here’s a detailed overview of the top global buyers of Russian energy over the past decade, focusing on the period from around 2015 through mid‑2025. Note that precise year‑by‑year breakdowns are limited, but available sources offer clear trends, especially after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Pre‑2022 (2015–2021)

Europe / EU was the dominant buyer of Russian oil and gas, in some years relying on Russia for over 40–50% of its pipeline gas and significant shares of coal and oil.

In 2021, for instance, the EU received over 50% of its natural gas from Russia (~140 billion m³) and Russia accounted for around half of EU gas demand overall.

Buyers in the 2022–2025 period (according to Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA)):

China

• From 5 December 2022 until the end of June 2025, China purchased 44% of all of Russia’s coal exports.

• Bought ~47% of Russia’s crude oil exports.

• Accounted for ~21–22% of oil products (by value) and ~21% of LNG.

• ~28–30% of pipeline gas purchases.

  
  

India

• ~37–38% of crude oil exports.

• ~19% of coal.

• Little or no LNG/pipeline gas.

• In May‑June 2025, India was the second‑largest market, importing ~€4.2–4.4 bn per month in fossil fuels.

Türkiye (NATO member)

• Largest importer of refined oil products (~26%), and ~6% of crude oil.

• ~11% of coal; ~27% of pipeline gas; ~6% of LNG.

• Earned typically €1.8–2.3 bn/month for Russia in mid‑2025.

• Turkish refineries also re‑export refined products—some ending up in Europe, creating sanction loopholes.

European Union

• Bought ~37–50% of Russian LNG and ~37–40% of pipeline gas (as of mid‑2025).

• In June 2025: EU was top LNG and pipeline‑gas buyer (50% LNG; 37% pipeline gas) but overall made up just ~6% of crude volume.

Other countries (Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, etc.)

• Oil products: Brazil ~12%, China 13%, Turkey ~26% of oil product exports.

• LNG: After EU, Japan ~18%.

• Coal: South Korea ~9–10%, Taiwan ~4–5%.

Summary Table: Approx. Share of Russia’s Fossil Fuel Exports by Buyer (2022 – mid‑2025)

Commodity	China	India	Türkiye	EU	Others
Crude Oil	~47%	~37–38%	~6%	~6%	remaining (~4%)
Coal	~44–45%	~18–19%	~10–11%	negligible	S Korea, Taiwan (~9–10%)
Oil Products	~13%	minimal	~25–26%	minor	Brazil (~11–12%)
LNG	~21%	minimal	~6%?	~50%	Japan (~18%)
Pipeline Gas	~28–30%	minimal	~25–27%	~37–40%	–

The data indicates that Turkiye (a NATO member), the EU, and Western partners have procured the largest share of energy from Russia. It is surprising that they refer to this situation as dependence and a lack of options for diversifying their energy sources. In contrast, India, which must cater to the needs of the world's largest population, is compelled to avoid purchasing cheaper oil.

Trends for energy exports from Russia keeping the crude/ coal out (2022- mid 2025).

Energy Commodity	Top Buyer (%)	2nd Buyer (%)	EU Share
Oil Products	Turkey ~25%	China ~13%, Brazil ~11%	Small
Pipeline Gas	China ~28%	Turkey ~25%	EU ~39%
LNG	EU ~50%	China ~20%, Japan ~18%	EU ~50%

Context & Notable Mechanisms

• Sanction evasion via refined oil exports from India and Turkey into Western markets (e.g. UK, Australia) has been documented as a way to bypass direct bans on Russian crude.

• Price discounts offered by Russia attracted buyers, which helped sustain energy revenue even under sanctions.

Why the Europeans and Americans are targeting India and China, because from 2022 onwards there's a shift toward Asia. After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and ensuing Western sanctions, a major realignment occurred:

Shifting flows overall (2022–2023)

• Asia and Oceania accounted for:

  • ~85% of Russia’s crude oil exports

  • ~84% of its coal exports

  • ~37% of its petroleum products exports

In Summary:

• China has consistently been Russia’s largest fossil‑fuel buyer (oil, coal products).

• Turkey stands out as the single biggest importer of refined products and pipeline gas after EU.

• The EU, while backing sanctions, still accounts for a significant share of Russia’s gas exports.

If INDIA did not buy Russian oil

Now, lets assume if India had not bought Russian oil after 2022, international oil prices would almost certainly have been significantly higher, possibly by $10–15 per barrel or more, especially during periods of tight global supply.

Here’s a breakdown of why:

India’s Role in Stabilizing Global Oil Prices (Post-2022)

• After Western sanctions, Russia redirected millions of barrels/day toward India at steep discounts (up to $30–35/barrel under Brent in 2022).

• India imported over 1.6–1.9 million barrels/day from Russia through 2023 and early 2024—more than 40x pre-war levels.

• By early 2025, India was absorbing 38–40% of Russia's total crude oil exports.

If India hadn’t stepped in, that crude would have either:

• Flooded a narrow Asian market (lowering prices even further but straining logistics), or

• Stayed unsold, tightening global supply.

  
  

Tight supply + war shocks = price surges without India

• Global oil markets were already tight in 2022–2023 due to:

  • OPEC+ production limits

  • U.S. shale slowdown

  • Post-COVID demand rebound

  • Shipping constraints due to Red Sea and Black Sea disruptions

Without India absorbing Russian oil, less oil would be available on global markets, forcing other nations (e.g. Europe, Asia) to compete for Middle Eastern and U.S. barrels.

That bidding war would have:

• Driven Brent crude back above $100–110/bbl (vs ~$80–90 in 2023–2024)

• Kept inflation high longer in oil-importing countries

• Prolonged energy cost crises in Europe and Asia

  
  

Price Estimate Scenarios (2022–2025)

Scenario	Brent Crude (Est. Price Impact)
With India buying ~2 mb/d	$75–95/barrel (actual)
Without India (no redirection)	$100–115/barrel
Full EU+India ban on Russian oil	$120+/barrel

Note: This assumes no major offset from OPEC or U.S. shale ramp-ups.

Global Impact Without Indian Imports

• Europe would have faced higher diesel and gasoline prices.

• Asia would have bid more for Middle East and U.S. crude, increasing regional transport costs.

• Developing nations in Africa and Southeast Asia might have faced energy insecurity due to affordability.

Expert Opinions & Model Estimates

• IEA (International Energy Agency) in 2023 noted that India's purchases were a “key pressure valve” keeping global oil prices from spiking.

• Analysts at Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan suggested that, without India and China stepping in, Russian oil may have exited the market entirely, causing Brent to hit $110–120/barrel.

• CREA estimated India’s imports saved Russia ~$20 billion/month in oil revenue in 2023–2024, indirectly subsidizing price stability for the global market.

Conclusion

If India had not bought Russian oil, global oil markets would have:

• Lost a key buffer for sanctioned Russian supply

• Tightened considerably

• Likely seen Brent crude exceed $110/barrel

• Extended the post-COVID energy crisis well into 2024–2025

India's purchases, while geopolitically controversial, softened the global energy blow—both for itself and indirectly for many other nations.

Points to be kept in mind while noting the above given data and analysis:

The datasets above are based largely on data from December 2022 through June 2025, when tracking became more robust under sanctions regimes by CREA.

Pre‑2022 annual country‑level import shares are more varied, but it’s widely agreed that Europe was dominant until sanctions pivoted flows eastward.

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References:  TIME, Wikipedia, Reddit, AP News, CREA1, CREA2, CREA3, The Guardian, heraldsun.com.au, The Guardian, expert discussions, YouTube videos, AI software's and research.